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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the toxic tort phenomenon has emerged as a vital
concern to manufacturers, employers, and consumers as Agent Or-
ange,' DES, 2 Dalkon Shield,3 and asbestos 4 victims have litigated
1. "Agent Orange," a defoliant that the United States military used in Vietnam, alleg-
edly contained tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, which is a highly toxic substance. Vietnam vet-
erans and their families allege that this substance has caused cancer, genetic damage, and
early death. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. DES is the abbreviation for diethylstilbestrol, a synthetic hormone administered to
prevent miscarriage. Doctors subsequently discovered that women exposed to the drug in
utero tended to develop cancer. Eli Lilly, the drug's developer, has faced numerous lawsuits
because of this problem. See, e.g., Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1984);
Mathis v. Eli Lilly and Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983).
3. The Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device (IUD), allegedly has caused uterine in-
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toxic tort claims.5 Toxic torts are unique because any number of
victims may be exposed to a toxic substance from which they may
contract a disease as far as twenty years in the future. Toxic tort
claims typically involve large sums of money and an inestimable
number of plaintiffs.7 The potential for tremendous, financially
crippling, liability for these injuries has prompted some asbestos
companies$ to file for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.e
A keystone of the American bankruptcy system is the dis-
charge of debt.10 Tort claimants qualify as creditors under the
fections, septicemia, endometriosis, septic abortions, and other serious gynecological
problems in women who used the device. These problems have prompted many lawsuits
against A. H. Robins, one of the principal producers of the Dalkon Shield. See, e.g., Setter v.
A. H. Robins, Co., 748 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1984); Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d
1180 (8th Cir. 1984); Kontoulas v. A. H. Robins Co., 745 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984); Mann v.
A. H. Robins Co., 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984); Sellers v. A. H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 1559
(11th Cir. 1983); Hansen v. A. H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1983); Philpott v. A.
H. Robins Co., 710 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1983); Blaha v. A. H. Robins and Co., 708 F.2d 238
(6th Cir. 1983). A. H. Robins recently has filed for reorganization under Chapter 11. Alexan-
der, Robins Runs for Shelter, TIME, Sept. 2, 1985, at 32.
4. "Asbestos" refers to a class of fire-resistant minerals. Exposure to asbestos can
cause asbestosis, a lung disease similar to emphysema, mesothelioma, chest cancer, and lung
cancer. Kelly, Manville's Bold Maneuver, TME, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17. Johns-Manville, the
largest producer of asbestos, has faced many claims from asbestos victims. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155
(8th Cir. 1975).
5. See generally Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573 (1983).
6. See Note, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases?:
Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVTL. L. 465, 466 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Who Will Compensate]; Special Project, supra note 5, at 641 n.390.
7. According to one source, over a quarter of a million people may die of asbestos-
related diseases in the next several decades. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 846, 847 (1984).
8. Amatex Industries, Unarco Industries, and Johns-Manville Corporation have filed
Chapter 11 petitions. See Comment, Product Liability Claims in the Bankruptcy Courts
After the 1984 Amendments: Four Standards to Limit "Related to" Jurisdiction, 17 U.C.D.
L. REv. 1247, 1248 n.7 (1984).
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (to be codified Supp. 1984). See
Comment, Will Financially Sound Corporate Debtors Succeed in Using Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act as a Shield Against Massive Tort Liability?, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 539, 543
(1983).
10. See Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-Ameri-
can Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1982). The bankrupt will emerge with a
fresh start after the court discharges his debt. See Hughes, Code Exemptions: Far-Reaching
Achievement, 28 DEPAuL L. REv. 1025, 1043 (1979) (discussing debtor's fresh start as a ma-
jor goal of bankruptcy).
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Bankruptcy Act,1" and tort claims, therefore, are subject to dis-
charge. Unlike commercial creditors, however, who voluntarily un-
dertake risks when extending credit, the tort victim does not vol-
untarily submit to creditor status. The tort victim whose claim a
court has discharged in bankruptcy, nonetheless, will receive no
compensation. Under a reorganization, however, the bankrupt may
continue to operate so that it can pay certain creditors.'2 If tort
victims can participate in the Chapter 11 reorganization process,
the reorganization plan may afford them some compensation. 3
Toxic tort victims who already have filed claims against a cor-
poration undergoing reorganization typically participate in the for-
mulation of a reorganization plan through committees that re-
present the plaintiffs' interests.'4 In contrast, future claimants,
who have not yet contracted a disease as a result of their exposure
to toxic matter, do not participate in the reorganization process.
Unlike the tort victims who already have filed claims, the terms of
the reorganization plan do not bind future claimants.' 5 Thus,
under the typical plan, Tort Victim A will receive whatever the
plan provides for her class of creditors. Tort Victim B, a future
claimant, may press her suit when it accrues and enforce the entire
judgment. If her claim is one of many future claims, however, she
may never recover because the substantial liability may force the
corporation to liquidate. In the alternative, Tort Victim B's claim
may trigger another Chapter 11 reorganization, in which case the
court will treat Victim B's claim like Victim A's claim.' 6 Courts,
therefore, may treat differently two plaintiffs whose injuries arose
from the same source, depending on when the defendant corpora-
tion undergoes reorganization. The only difference between the two
claims is that one injury manifested itself sooner than the other.
Recently, defendant debtors have sought to circumscribe their
potential protracted and unlimited liability by attempting to per-
11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982) (defining creditor as an entity with a claim against the
estate).
12. Note, Relief from Tort Liability Through Reorganization, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1227,
1232 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Relief from Tort Liability].
13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103, 1123, 1126, 1129 (1982) (discussing the role of credi-
tors' committees in the formulation of a reorganization plan).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102 (1982); see In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 741, 743 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (The court appointed a committee of plaintiffs from pending asbestos cases against
defendant-debtor.).
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1982). This section provides that the reorganization plan
is binding on creditors. Id; see infra note 18. Thus, unless the court considers future claim-
ants to be creditors within the meaning of the Code, the plan is not binding on them.
16. In the second reorganization, Courts would consider Victim B to be a creditor.
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suade bankruptcy courts to appoint representatives for these fu-
ture claimants. 17 These representatives would represent the future
plaintiffs' interests during the reorganization process, and, if the
court considers future claimants to be creditors, the court could
bind them to the reorganization plan.'8 The question of whether to
appoint a representative for future claimants raises three principal
issues: (1) whether a future claimant is a "creditor" or a "party in
interest" under the Bankruptcy Code; (2) whether a bankruptcy
court's equitable powers enable the court to consider future claim-
ants' interests; and (3) whether binding future claimants to a reor-
ganization plan violates due process requirements. Three courts
have considered the question of whether to appoint a representa-
tive for future claimants' 9 and have reached different results for
different reasons.20
The purpose of this Recent Development is to analyze these
decisions and propose a solution that will benefit debtors and cred-
itors, including future claimants. Part II discusses three issues: (1)
the definitions of "creditor" and "party in interest"; (2) the scope
of a bankruptcy court's equitable powers; and (3) due process re-
quirements. Part II also considers the analogy between representa-
tion in class action suits and representation in reorganization pro-
ceedings. Part III examines three recent decisions that address the
question of whether to appoint a representative for future claim-
ants in a reorganization proceeding. Part IV analyzes these deci-
sions in light of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, tort
law, and due process requirements. Part IV also considers the po-
tential precedential ramifications of these rulings. Part V stresses
the need for uniformity in bankruptcy law and contends that ap-
pointing representatives for future toxic tort claimants in bank-
17. Compare In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. IM. 1983) (refusing to ap-
point a representative) with In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (permitting the appointment of a representative).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1982). This section provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided ... the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any
entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan,
and any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor [sic], whether
or not the claim or interest of such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner
is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or
general partner has accepted the plan.
Id.
19. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re UNR
Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985).
20. See infra notes 100-68 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy reorganization proceedings and binding the future claim-
ants to the reorganization plan strikes the best balance among the
competing concerns in this modern dilemna.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Tort Claims Under The Bankruptcy Act
In a Chapter 11 proceeding the debtor must submit a reorgan-
ization plan within 120 days after filing the bankruptcy petition.21
Once the debtor files the petition, the court will appoint a commit-
tee of unsecured creditors and may appoint additional creditors'
committees at the request of a party in interest. 2 These commit-
tees participate in the formulation of the reorganization plan 3 and
may collect and file rejections or approvals of the plan. 4 The court
then will confirm the plan if it meets certain statutory conditions. 5
Once the plan is confirmed, it binds all creditors and the debtor.2 6
Unless the plan provides otherwise, the court discharges the
debtor's prepetition debts. The debtor then continues to operate
in business and pay certain creditors according to the plan.2 s
The Bankruptcy Code determines whom the reorganization
plan affects. The Code defines "creditor" as an "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the
order for relief concerning the debtor. '29 Accordingly, to qualify as
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
22. Id. § 1102(a)(2).
23. Id. § 1103(c)(3).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1129(a). This section provides:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The plan complies with the applicable provisions of this title.
(2) The proponent of the plan complies with the applicable provisions of this
title.
(3) The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law.
(8) With respect to each class of claims of interests-
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan....
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor
under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
Id.
26. Id. § 1141(a).
27. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
28. Id. § 123.
29. Id. § 101(q)(A).
1985] 1373
1374 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1369
a "creditor," a party first must demonstrate that it has a "claim"
cognizable in bankruptcy. The former Bankruptcy Act"0 required
that tort claims must be "provable" to be recognized in bank-
ruptcy.3 1 The new Bankruptcy Code, 2 however, broadened the
definition of a "claim." The present Code does not require that a
claim must be "provable." Instead, section 101(4) defines "claim"
as a "right to payment," regardless of whether that right is fixed,
contingent, or provable.33  The legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the term "claim" to encompass "all legal obliga-
tions of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent."34
Second, to qualify as a creditor, a party must prove that its
claim arose "at the time of or before the order for relief concerning
the debtor. 3 5 Absent any overriding federal provision, courts rely
30. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151, 326
(1982).
31. Id. at § 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(7) (repealed 1978) (permitting proof and al-
lowing damages for negligence if suit instituted prior to petition). Tort cases decided under
the former Act paid strict attention to this statutory language. The dispute in In re Glad-
ding Corp., 20 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), for instance, concerned a creditor who
had purchased a vehicle from the debtor and then sold the vehicle to a third party. Id. The
third party brought a tort action against the creditor, who sought to implead the debtor. Id.
The debtor had filed a Chapter XI petition prior to the second sale and maintained that the
petition had discharged this claim. Id. at 567. The court, however, held that "a mere possi-
bility of a claim of unknown origin, in an unknown amount, and which only might arise, if at
all, at some unknown time" is incapable of proof and therefore not cognizable in bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 568.
32. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
33. 11 U.S.C. 101(4)(A) (1982). This section defines "claim" as a "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured
. ... "Id.
34. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5788, 5808. The legislative history of this provision further indicates: "By this
broadest possible definition of the term throughout the title 11 . . . the bill contemplates
that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be dealt
with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest relief possible in the bankruptcy
court." Id. But see Note, Relief From Tort Liability, supra note 12, at 1228 (arguing that
Congress did not foresee tort liability as a potential cause of bankruptcy when Congress
redrafted the Code). Courts that have interpreted the new Code have recognized the broad-
ening effect of the amendment. See, e.g., In re La Bonte, 13 Bankr. 887 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981) (holding that a debtor's guarantor on a note was a "creditor" with a "claim"); In re
Thomas, 12 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981) (holding that an assignee of support pay-
ments was a "creditor").
35. See supra text accompanying note 29. One court has asserted that Congress in-
tended that the term "claim" encompass only contractual obligations, not tort obligations.
See In re UNR Indus. Inc., 29 Bankr. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The great weight of author-
ity, however, makes no such distinction. See generally Countryman, The Use of State Law
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on state law to determine whether a claim is valid at the time the
debtor files its petition.36 In a case concerning future claimants,
the plaintiffs are likely to be residents of different states. Deter-
mining whether these plaintiffs have claims under state law be-
comes complicated because the accrual of a tort claim differs from
state to state.37 The scope of a bankruptcy court's equitable power,
therefore, may determine whether a future tort claim is a "claim"
cognizable in bankruptcy.
Finally, in addition to "creditors" with cognizable "claims,"
anyone who qualifies as a "party in interest" may appear in a
Chapter 11 proceeding.3 8 The Bankruptcy Code does not define the
term "party in interest" precisely, but the Code does indicate that
Congress did not intend for the list of parties in interest in section
1109(b) to be exclusive.3 9 Courts generally have agreed that they
should construe the term "party in interest" broadly to permit af-
fected parties to appear and assert their interests.40 Within this
broad construct, courts must determine on a case by case basis
whether a party has a sufficient interest to mandate
representation.
41
in Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 411 & n.24 (1972) (under the former Bank-
ruptcy Act tort claims are not provable unless reduced to judgment).
36. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946); see
also In re Spanish Trails Lanes, Inc., 16 Bankr. 304, 306 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) (stating that
bankruptcy court must rely on state law to determine whether a claim exists). But see cases
cited infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which bankruptcy courts
recognized claims regardless of their status under state law).
37. For example, a claim for a disease with a long latency period accrues at different
times under different state laws. In some states a claim accrues when the disease invades the
victim's body. In other states a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should have
known of the disease. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115-16 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982). This section provides in pertinent part: "A party in
interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders'
committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and
may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter." Id.
39. See id. § 102(3) (1982) (stating that the terms "includes" and "including" are not
limiting); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, 1 1109.02, at 1109-24 (15th ed.
1984).
40. See In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 37 Bankr. 617, 628 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1984); In re
Citizen's Loan & Thrift Co., 7 Bankr. 88, 90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1980); see also 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTcY, supra note 39, T 1109.02.
41. In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 Bankr. 941, 943 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); see,
e.g., In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 37 Bankr. 617, 628 n.10 (N.D. m. 1984) (allowing state
director of financial institutions to intervene as party in interest on behalf of the state); In
re Citizen's Loan & Thrift Co., 7 Bankr. 88, 90 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (allowing a representative
for the state as a party in interest because the state had an interest in supervising industrial
loan companies).
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B. Scope of the Equitable Power of the Bankruptcy Court
Through the Bankruptcy Code, Congress prescribed the outer
limits42 of a bankruptcy court's equitable authority.43 Within these
bounds, bankruptcy courts have broad equitable powers. The
United States Supreme Court asserted in Pepper v. Litton44 that a
bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers to enter any judg-
ment that the bankruptcy court believes necessary to enforce the
provisions of the Code.45
In Chapter 11 proceedings, bankruptcy courts have exercised
their equitable powers by balancing the need for prompt determi-
nation of a reorganization plan against individuals' rights. In
Katchen v. Landy,48 for example, the Supreme Court denied the
petitioner a jury trial because the petitioner presented his claim in
a bankruptcy context.47 The Court emphasized the need for sum-
mary adjudication of claims relating to the estate of a bankrupt.48
Even though the petitioner asserted a legal claim, the Court held
that the petitioner had no right to a jury trial because a bank-
ruptcy case is an equity proceeding.49 Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied a request for a jury
trial in a Chapter 11 proceeding because the court found that the
interest in prompt determination of a reorganization plan, which
affected all parties, outweighed the individual's interest in a jury
trial.50
Bankruptcy courts also have used their equitable powers to
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) ("A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of
equity . . ").
43. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, at I 3.01(b)[ii] (exercise of equitable
power subject to provisions of title 11).
44. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
45. Id. at 304. The Court repeatedly emphasized the broad equitable powers that
bankruptcy courts have exercised in many contexts. Id.
46. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
47. Id. at 336-37.
48. Id. at 339.
49. Id. at 336-37.
50. In re Michigan Brewing Co., 24 F. Supp. 430, 431 (W.D. Mich. 1938), aft'd, 101
F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1939). The court asserted:
[I]t is the view of the court that the rights of which petitioner will be deprived by being
required to present his claims in the bankruptcy court are not substantial when com-
pared with the rights... [of] all parties in interest to have prompt submission and
determination of a plan of reorganization.
Id. Other courts also have emphasized the need for prompt reorganization and have used
the court's equitable power to deny a jury trial. See, e.g., In re Rude, 101 F. 805 (D. Ky.
1900) (right to have jury rule on attorney's fees is a matter of discretion); In re Christensen,
101 F. 243 (N.D. Iowa 1900) (chancery methods used to investigate claim against bankrupt).
1376 [Vol. 38:1369
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determine whether a claim is cognizable in bankruptcy. In In re
Spanish Trails Lines51 a bankruptcy court relied on its equitable
authority to recognize a contract claim that the parties could not
enforce in state court.52 The court asserted that Congress had
given bankruptcy courts the power to look beyond applicable state
law to effect the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
maintained that "[s]ubstantial right and justice rather than techni-
cal form control. ' 54 Looking to the circumstances surrounding the
claim, the court found that the claimant had enriched the debtor
and thus had a valid claim for purposes of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.5 5 Similarly, the court in In re Leeds Homes, Inc.56 used its
equitable power to allow a corporation to enforce a claim in bank-
ruptcy even though the state had not authorized the corporation to
conduct business. 57 These cases58 clearly indicate that a bank-
ruptcy court can use its equitable powers to recognize the existence
of claims for bankruptcy purposes regardless of the status of the
claims under state law.
C. Due Process Requirements
The constitutional requirement of notice is one of a court's
primary concerns with appointing a representative for future
claimants.59 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.6 0 is the
51. 16 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981).
52. Id. at 307-08. A state statute rendered the contract unenforceable. Id.; see ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1151 (Supp. 1984).
53. 16 Bankr. at 307. The court stated, "To effectuate the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code in successfully rehabilitating distressed debtors while at the same time treating credi-
tors in a fair and equitable manner, bankruptcy courts must broaden their vision to include
not only applicable state law, but the circumstances surrounding the claims in question." Id.
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 308.
56. 222 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
57. Id. at 20.
58. See also Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
The case concerned the validity of a covenant to pay interest to mortgage bondholders. The
Court held that, because residents of many different states were parties to the contract, the
bankruptcy court should not apply the law of the state in which the bankruptcy court sits.
Id. at 162. Rather, the court must "enforce the Bankruptcy Act . . . in accordance with
authority granted by Congress to determine. . . what claims shall be allowed under equita-
ble principles." Id. at 162-63. The Court also noted that the validity of a claim under state
law was irrelevant because the Court would still have to decide whether allowing the claim
would be consistent with the policies of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 162.
59. See Note, Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in
Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153, 160-61, 162-63 (1982) (stating that while bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are subject to the due process requirements of notice and a hearing, courts han-
dling contingent claims should balance the competing concerns of expediency and notice on
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leading case concerning the notice requirement of the due process
clause. In Mullane the Supreme Court considered the adequacy of
notice by publication to beneficiaries of a common trust fund in an
accounting action. The bank had appointed a guardian for all ab-
sent persons, known or unknown, who might have had an interest
in the income of the trust fund.6' The Court adopted a balancing
approach to determine whether publication provided adequate no-
tice to the absent beneficiaries.6 2 The Court balanced the state's
interest in bringing the trust claims to a final settlement against
the individual interest in notification. The Court noted that it
could not justify placing "impractical" or "impossible" burdens on
the state.6 3 The Court, nevertheless, required notice to be "reason-
ably calculated . . . to apprise interest parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. ' 64 The Court, therefore, found notice by publication inade-
quate as a means of informing beneficiaries whom the state could
notify personally.6
The Court noted that when circumstances prevent individual
notice, the Court will approve the form of notice selected if it is at
least as likely to accomplish its goal as other forms of notice.6 6 In
the case of missing or unknown persons, the Court determined that
an indirect or even futile form of notice would satisfy due pro-
cess. 17 Concerning the beneficiaries whose interests were future or
conjectural, the Court recognized that the difficulties and costs of
notifying these persons placed an unreasonable burden on the
state. The Court, therefore, held that notice by publication to fu-
ture or conjectural beneficiaries satisfied due process. 8
a case-by-case basis).
60. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
61. Id. at 310.
62. Id. at 314.
63. Id. at 313-14.
64. Id. at 314.
65. Id. at 318-19.
66. Id. at 315.
67. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 318. The Court stated:
Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense with more certain
notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future or, al-
though they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business
come to knowledge [sic] of the common trustee. Whatever searches might be required
in another situation under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the character of
the proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think them unneces-
sary. We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on fre-
quent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries, many of whose
1378 [Vol. 38:1369
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A number of courts following the Supreme Court's decision in
Mullane have applied a balancing test in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.6 9 In City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co.,70 for example, the Supreme Court held that notice by
publication was inadequate to inform a lien creditor of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding because the debtor could have notified the cred-
itor by mail. The Court insisted that even creditors who are aware
of a reorganization have a right to "reasonable notice" before a
bankruptcy court can bar their claims.71 In In re DCA Develop-
ment Corp.,72 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, after applying the Mullane balancing test, found that
the interest in a final and efficient resolution of claims is particu-
larly strong in bankruptcy proceedings.7" The court, therefore, con-
cluded that in this case informal or constructive notice satisfied
due process.
7 4
Notably, the majority of cases to apply the Mullane balancing
test in bankruptcy proceedings have concerned notice require-
ments to ascertainable parties.75 In In re GAC Corp. 6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered the
due process requirements for notice to unascertainable parties. In
this instance, the bankruptcy court sought to notify all purchasers
of the bankrupt corporation's debentures of a class action filed on
their behalf so that the purchasers could file proofs of claims, as
required by the Code. 7 The court held that publication in fifty-
interests in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we have no doubt
that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in the name of due
process. The expense of keeping informed from day to day of substitutions among even
current income beneficiaries and presumptive remaindermen, to say nothing of the far
greater number of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe burden on the plan,
and would likely dissipate its advantages. These are practical matters in which we
should be reluctant to disturb the judgment of the state authorities.
Id. at 317-18.
69. See Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceed-
ings, 84 YALE L.J. 1505, 1509 (1975).
70. 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
71. Id. at 297.
72. 489 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 46. The court noted that delay can allow the debtor's assets to diminish with
no corresponding benefit to the creditors. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 47. The court cited several previous cases in which courts found that infor-
mal or constructive notice satisfied due process in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. (citing Fer-
guson v. Bucks County Farms, Inc., 280 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1960); Harris v. Capehart-Farns-
worth Corp., 207 F.2d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 1953) (further citations omitted)).
75. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 70-74.
76. 681 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1982) (describing the procedure for filing a proof of claim).
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three leading newspapers satisfied the notice requirement of the
due process clause because personal notice would have been overly
burdensome and the purchasers' claims were speculative. 7
D. Analogy: The Class Action Standard of Notice
Recently, courts have found that an examination of the notice
requirement in class actions is helpful in determining the proper
notice requirement for reorganization proceedings. 9 Although in-
jured parties typically do not bring toxic tort claims as class ac-
tions, 0 a future claimants' representative in a reorganization pro-
ceeding could seek certification for a class action. Furthermore, a
representative for future claimants in a bankruptcy reorganization
would be in an analogous position to a class representative in a
class action suit.81
Notice in a class action gives the class members an opportu-
nity to opt out or to participate in the litigation." For the court to
certify a 23(b)(3) class,8 the representatives must give the best
practicable notice under the circumstances to the members of the
See generally Note, Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in
Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 153 (1982) (arguing that the use of class actions would provide
a viable method of estimating contingent claims for the purpose of fulfilling the Code's pro-
cedural requirements).
78. 681 F.2d at 1300. One commentator has asserted that In re DCA and In re GAC
together stand for the proposition that a bankruptcy court exercises an important role in
balancing the need for individual notice against the need to resolve the case. The court,
therefore, has discretion in mandating the form of notice to inform creditors of the proceed-
ing. See Note, Manville: Good Faith Re-organization or "Insulated" Bankruptcy, 12 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 121, 148-49 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Manville].
79. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 741, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re REA
Express, Inc., 10 Bankr. 812, 814 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir.) (denying class certification for toxic tort victims), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1982); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (denying class certification for
DES victims).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
82. Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair" With National
Classes, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1487, 1504 (1984).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This provision reads in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy ....
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class.8 4 Rule 23(c)(2) requires personal notice to all members whom
the representative can identify through reasonable effort.8 5 In Ei-
sen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin"8 the Court strictly applied the lan-
guage of Rule 23. The plaintiff in Eisen contended that individual
notice to over two million members was cost-prohibitive, particu-
larly because each individual had only minimal interest in the out-
come of the case.8 7 The Court rejected this argument and inti-
mated that the Mullane balancing test was irrelevant because Rule
23 exclusively governed the notice issue. 8
Parties in mass tort actions face the same notice issues. In
Payton v. Abbott Labs 9 the plaintiff class consisted of a defined
group of women whom the defendant allegedly had exposed to
DES in utero. The court reasoned that notice by publication would
deprive future plaintiffs of the opportunity to opt out of the ac-
tion, thus unjustly prohibiting them from seeking compensation. 0
The court in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,91
however, certified a 23(b)(3) class of toxic tort plaintiffs.9 2 The
court found that the notice requirement was not a prohibitive bar-
rier because the rules require only "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances."'93 The court suggested that the best no-
tice might include notification through the news media.
9 4
Parties may be able to avoid the notice issue in a 23(b)(1)(B)
class action 5 because the stringent notice requirement of 23(c)(2)
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). This section provides: "In any class action maintained
under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort." Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
87. Id. at 175-76. The Court held that individual notice was not discretionary and thus
could not be waived. For a criticism of this view, see Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class
Actions, supra note 82, at 1507-08 (asserting that -when a minimal interest is at stake, a
court should relax notice requirements accordingly).
88. 417 U.S. at 177. ("[Q]uite apart from what due process may require, the command
of Rule 23 is clearly to the contrary.").
89. 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
90. Id. at 393. The court was concerned with the high stakes associated with the vic-
tims' chance of developing cancer. Id.
91. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. The class included all persons whom the Army allegedly had exposed to Agent
Orange and various members of their families. Id. at 787.
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94. 506 F. Supp. at 791.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) states:
An action may be maintained as a class action if ... (1) the prosecution of sepa-
rate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
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does not apply.96 In In re Northern District "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Products Liability Litigation,97 however, the court declined to cer-
tify a mass toxic tort class as a 23(b)(1)(B) class.98 The Agent Or-
ange court also refused to certify the class under 23(b)(1)(B) be-
cause the court found no evidence that the claims would bankrupt
the defendant.99
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A. In re UNR Industries, Inc.
In In re UNR Industries, Inc.100 the involvement of the debtor
corporation in over 17,000 asbestos-related lawsuits prompted the
corporation and its subsidiaries to file for reorganization under
Chapter 11.101 The court appointed two creditors' committees to
participate in the reorganization plan: a committee of suppliers
and lenders and a committee of asbestos plaintiffs.102 The debtor
then requested that the court appoint a representative for un-
known asbestos plaintiffs because neither of the two creditors'
committees represented these claimants' interests. 10 3 The debtor
contended that although the Code does not expressly authorize a
court to appoint a representative for unknown claimants, a bank-
ruptcy court has the equitable power to grant the appointment to
fulfill the intent of the Code.10 4 Specifically, the debtor argued that
future tort claims fit within the class of claims dischargeable under
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests
Id.
96. In re N. Dist. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193
(N.D. Cal. 1981). Under Rule 23(c)(2), the notice requirement only applies to a 23(b)(3)
class.
97. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
98. Id. at 851. The court asserted that it could not certify a class under 23(b)(1)(B)
unless separate actions would "inescapably ... alter the substance of the rights of others
having similar claims." Id. (citations omitted). The court then refused to certify a
23(b)(1)(B) class action in this case because the "detrimental effect of separate [actions] is
not clearly inescapable." Id.
99. 506 F. Supp. at 789.
100. 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. I1. 1983).
101. Id. at 743.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 744.
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Chapter 11105 and that future claimants are creditors within the
meaning of the Code. 06
The bankruptcy court rejected the debtor's arguments and re-
fused to appoint a representative for future claimants. First, the
court asserted that the claims referred to under Chapter 11 dealt
with contract obligations, not tort liability.'0 7 Second, the court
maintained that future plaintiffs had no claims under the Code be-
cause their claims did not arise at the proper time. 08 The court
insisted that tort claims do not arise until the plaintiff suffers in-
jury. Putative claimants who have not yet suffered injury thus
have no claims cognizable in bankruptcy. 0
The court then addressed the practical problems of appointing
a representative for putative claimants. Noting that most courts
have denied class certification in mass tort actions," 0 the court re-
fused to appoint a representative for future claimants because ade-
quate representation, which is impossible to achieve in a class ac-
tion, would be no more practicable in the present context."' The
court next considered the problem of notifying future claimants.
The court required personal notice for a judgment to bind injured
parties." 2 The court concluded that personal notice was impossible
because of the variety of ways in which asbestos-related injuries
can arise."13 Finally, the court maintained that it had no power to
decide the claims of future plaintiffs." 4 The court recognized that
its holding may deprive future claimants of a remedy, but the
court asserted that Congress must find a solution to this
problem."1
5
105. Id. at 744-45; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (defining claim).
106. 29 Bankr. at 745; see supra notes 29, 35 and accompanying text (defining
creditor).
107. 29 Bankr. at 745.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 746.
111. Id. at 747 (maintaining that if no individual could represent present asbestosis
sufferers adequately in a consolidated case, then one representative could not represent ade-
quately future claimants' interests in a single proceeding).
112. Id. The court cited Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 88-89) and Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) (hold-
ing eviction notice on tenant's door not sufficient to satisfy due process).
113. 29 Bankr. at 747. For example, shipyard workers, school children, and members
of asbestos workers' families all have received some exposure to asbestos. The severity of
their injuries varies with the degree of exposure. Id.
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The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit dismissed the debtor's appeal. 116 Writing for the court,
Judge Posner discussed whether a bankruptcy court's equitable
powers would enable the court to provide for future plaintiffs."
7
Posner found that putative plaintiffs may be better off if a court
were to appoint a representative for future plaintiffs. He conceded,
however, that providing for innumerable unidentified plaintiffs
would be "a quixotic undertaking far beyond the realistic bounda-
ries of judicial competence.""" Posner reiterated the district
court's plea for a legislative solution to the problem. 19
B. In re Amatex Corporation
The debtor in In re Amatex Corp. (Amatex 1)120 asked the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
future asbestos claimants. The court refused to appoint a guardian
because the court found that a reorganization plan cannot affect
future claims.' 2 ' The court reached this conclusion after carefully
examining the Chapter 11 provisions that address the nature of
claims and interests subject to a reorganization plan. 122 The sec-
tions that describe a plan's contents'23 and confirmation 2 4 both
emphasize "claims" and "interests.' 2 The section that addresses
116. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984). The court dismissed the
appeal on the grounds that the district court's order, which denied appointment, was not an
appealable order. Id. at 1120-21.
117. Id. at 1119-20.
118. Id. at 1120.
119. Id.
120. 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
121. Id. at 315. The court did not address the issue of notice requirements. Further-
more, the court dismissed the debtor's argument concerning a bankruptcy court's equitable
powers in one conclusory sentence. Id. at 315-16. By adhering to a strict construction of the
statutory language, however, the court implied that it had only narrow equitable capabili-
ties. See infra text accompanying note 179.
122. Id. at 311-15. The court noted that the reorganization plan can affect only claims
and interests. Id.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982). This section provides that a plan shall:
(1) designate . . . classes of claims . . . and classes of interests; (2) specify any class of
claims or interests that is not impaired under the plan; (3) specify the treatment of any
class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan; (4) provide the same treat-
ment for each claim or interest or a particular class, unless the holder of a particular
claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or inter-
est. . ..
Id.
124. See id. § 1129 (describing prerequisites for confirmation of a plan).




a confirmed plan's effect specifically states that confirmation of a
plan "discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation."' 6
The court proceeded to examine the legislative history of cer-
tain Code definitions. Specifically, the court examined the defini-
tion of "creditor," which the Code defines as a "holder of prepeti-
tion claims against the debtor."'21 7 According to the court, a
reorganization plan may not affect future claimants because Con-
gress intended that a plan affect only prepetition claims. 28 The
court concluded that, because future plaintiffs' injuries have not
become manifest, these plaintiffs do not hold claims within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.129 Confirmation of a plan, there-
fore, would not discharge these future claims, 130 and the court
would serve no purpose by appointing a guardian to represent in-
terests that the Bankruptcy Code does not recognize.
131
On appeal (Amatex I), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed the district court order and used a
"party in interest" rationale to justify appointing a representative
for future claimants.13 2 The court specifically noted that it need
not determine whether future claimants were "creditors" with
"claims" because the court could appoint a representative for fu-
ture claimants as "parties in interest."'3 3 Citing the broad judicial
construction of the term "party in interest,"'3 4 the court found
that the reorganization proceeding sufficiently affected future
claimants to warrant including them within the process. 3 5 The
court noted that future claimants have different interests than
other creditors, and that if the court denied future claimants rep-
resentation, current claimants would receive a greater portion of a
limited fund. 36 For these reasons, the Third Circuit appointed a
representative to protect future claimants' interests.
37
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1982).
127. 30 Bankr. at 314 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982)).
128. 30 Bankr. at 315.
129. Id. In making this distinction, the court relied on the discovery principle embod-
ied in many states' statutes of limitations. See id.
130. Id. ("[T]he Code provides that a debtor is only discharged from debts which
arose prior to the confirmation of the plan.").
131. Id. at 316.
132. 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 1041.
134. Id. at 1042 (discussing cases cited supra note 41).
135. 755 F.2d at 1042.
136. Id. at 1043.
137. Id. The court, however, declined to decide "whether future claimants can or
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C. In re Johns-Manville Corporation
In In re Johns-Manville Corp.3 ' the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy because of the debtor's potentially vast liability for asbes-
tos-related claims. 3 ' Statistics indicated that the debtor corpora-
tion's liability over the next twenty years easily could have
amounted to over two billion dollars and could have forced the cor-
poration into liquidation.140 The court noted that any plan ignor-
ing the interests of future claimants would not serve either the
debtor's or the creditors' interests.'" Moreover, the drain these
claims imposed could force the debtor to file for reorganization
again and again, and even these filings might not prevent
liquidation.
42
To determine whether a court could appoint a representative
for future claimants, the Manville court focused on the "party in
interest" language of the Bankruptcy Code.1' 3 The court held that
future plaintiffs were "parties in interest" who possessed cogniza-
ble interests in the reorganization proceeding. 44 Section 1109(b)
states that "[A]ny party in interest ... may appear and be heard
on any issue in a case under this chapter."'4 5 Although the Code
does not define "party in interest," the court adopted a broad defi-
nition of the term.14 Under a broad definition, future claimants
would be parties in interest because denying them representation
would render the entire plan meaningless. 47 The court found that
Congress designed the elastic concept of "party in interest" for just
should be considered 'creditors' under the Code [or] whether constitutionally adequate no-
tice can be provided to such a class . . . ." Id.
138. 36 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
139. See Note, Manville, supra note 78, at 122.
140. 36 Bankr. at 746.
141. Id.
142. Id. (asserting that "[ilt fosters the key aims of Chapter 11 to avoid liquidation at
all reasonable costs"); accord In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1981) ("Congressional purpose in enacting the statute was to encourage resort to bankruptcy
reorganization as a means of avoiding unnecessary or premature liquidation, to relieve dis-
tressed corporations and to provide the mechanics for reorganization, and to permit the
debtor to restructure the debts and pay creditors while retaining its property." (citations
omitted)).
143. 36 Bankr. at 747-57.
144. Id. at 745.
145. Id. at 747 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982)).
146. Id. The court noted that Collier advocated a broad definition of the term "party
in interest." See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, at 1109.02 [3] (use of word
"including" in 1109(b) does not limit party in interest to listed entities).




this kind of situation. 14 8 The court also found that because expo-
sure to asbestos generates enough of an interest to trigger insur-
ance coverage,'149 exposure should give future plaintiffs sufficient
interest to qualify as parties in interest. 50
In reaching this conclusion, the Manville court criticized the
Amatex and UNR opinions. First, the court criticized the Amatex
I court's determination that future claimants held no claims cogni-
zable in bankruptcy because the claims were not prepetition
claims. 151 The Manville court noted that "the fixation of a statute
of limitations is totally unrelated to the status of future claimants
as parties in interest.'1 52 The policy behind a statute of limitations
is to prevent defendants from having to litigate claims that have
become stale. 53 Determining whether future plaintiffs are parties
in interest, however, requires a court to consider the potential det-
riment to these parties if the court does not allow
representation.
5 4
Second, the Manville court criticized the Seventh Circuit's in-
terpretation of the term "claim.' 55 Citing the legislative history,
158
the Manville court accused the UNR court of ignoring future
claimants and thus defeating the drafters' intention that courts ad-
dress all of the debtor's obligations in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
57
The Manville court also challenged the Seventh Circuit's assertion
that state law defines the cognizability of a claim.' 58 The Manville
court declared that this determination would "contravene the Con-
stitutional requirement of uniformity in the laws of bank-
ruptcy.' 59 According to the Manville court, state laws that place
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing numerous cases holding that exposure to asbestos triggers insurance
coverage).
150. Id. at 750 (asserting that plaintiffs who have an insurable interest have sufficient
interest in these proceedings to qualify as parties in interest).
151. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
152. 36 Bankr. at 750 n.4.
153. Id. at 752. The court also noted that, contrary to what the Amatex court asserted,
not all states date the tolling of the statute of limitations from the point of injury manifes-
tation. Id. at 751-52.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 754 (criticizing the Seventh Circuit's position that future tort claims are
not "claims" for bankruptcy purposes because they are grounded in tort law instead of con-
tract law); see also supra text accompanying notes 107-09 (discussing the UNR court's in-
terpretation of "claim").
156. 36 Bankr. at 754 n.6.
157. Id. at 754.




limitations on federal bankruptcy law must yield to federal legal
constructs.
1 6 0
The Manville court next turned to the problem of notice, stat-
ing that "[tihe court... must balance the individual's interest...
against the overall interest of efficient final resolution of claims." ''
In this case the court found that the logistical problem of notice
was not insurmountable.162 The tremendous publicity given to
Manville's bankruptcy filing had already notified many putative
claimants.' Furthermore, because notice is an "elastic concept,"
the court could require supplemental mailings or publications if
the initial publicity subsequently appeared insufficient.164 The
Manville court, therefore, did not find that the notice requirement
precluded appointing a representative for future claimants.165
Finally, the Manville court espoused a broad view of the bank-
ruptcy court's equitable powers, declaring that Congress vested
these powers in the courts to enable them to respond to extraordi-
nary cases like the present one.166 The court noted that previous
bankruptcy courts had used their equitable powers to protect the
rights of absent persons whom the court's decision would affect. 67
According to the Manville court, the statutory authority in section
1109(b) to appoint a representative for future claimants provided
an even stronger basis for asserting the court's broad equitable
power in this case.1 68
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Permitting the Appointment of a Representative for Future
Claimants
1. Consistency with Bankruptcy Policy
Appointing a representative for future claimants in cases of
potential tort liability promotes the specific goals of Chapter 11.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 756 n.6 (quoting In re DCA Dev. Corp., 489 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1973)).




166. Id. at 757.
167. 36 Bankr. at 758. The court relied particularly on Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206,
18 N.E.2d 202 (1938), in which the Illinois Supreme Court used its equitable discretion to
appoint a representative for unborn remaindermen in the absence of statutory authority. 36
Bankr. at 758.
168. 36 Bankr. at 758.
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Congress created Chapter 11 reorganizations because of the com-
mon belief that preserving a business entity is preferable to liqui-
dating it."" The reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
preserve business entities and provide for an efficient disposition of
bankrupt entities' assets. 170 This result benefits the debtor, the
creditors, and the economy as a whole.17 1 Although appointing a
representative for future claimants is not mandated in every
case,172 when the debtor does face the potential of future liability,
failure to bind future claimants to a reorganization plan could lead
to a succession of Chapter 11 filings. This result is clearly ineffi-
cient and economically undesirable. 17 3 Moreover, because toxic
torts involve innumerable potential victims and long latency peri-
ods prior to discovery, an efficient resolution for the problems fac-
ing debtors and other creditors is almost impossible unless the re-
organization plan incorporates future claimants' interests.
Apart from promoting the specific goals of Chapter 11, bank-
ruptcy courts uphold the general aims of the entire bankruptcy
system by appointing a representative for future claimants. First,
the bankruptcy system aspires to treat creditors equally. Equal
treatment discourages the creditors from racing to court.7 4 Only
by binding future claimants to a reorganization plan can courts en-
sure equal treatment of future plaintiffs. 75 Second, future tort
claims threaten debtor rehabilitation, another goal of bank-
ruptcy. 7 6 Creditors will not do business with an entity that faces
substantial future tort liability.177 Providing for future claims in a
reorganization plan, however, would encourage lenders to extend
credit to the debtor and thus would promote the debtor's
rehabilitation.
Another pervasive principle of bankruptcy is the bankruptcy
169. See Note, Manville, supra note 78, at 151 (asserting that preservation of ongoing
business is important objective of business reorganization).
170. See id. (asserting that new Chapter 11 offers more speed, efficiency, and protec-
tion for all parties).
171. Note, Relief from Tort Liability, supra note 12, at 1242.
172. Providing for future claimants in a reorganization plan, however, could be costly,
cumbersome, and unnecessary. A rule requiring courts to provide for future claimants in all
reorganizations would contravene the underlying policy of Chapter 11, particularly when the
debtor did not predicate the filing of its petition on the possibility of future liability.
173. See Note, Manville, supra note 78, at 152.
174. See id.
175. See, for example, the hypothetical situation discussed supra text accompanying
notes 14-16.
176. See Roe, supra note 7, at 920.
177. 29 Bankr. at 743.
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court's authority to act in equity.178 The UNR, Amatex, and
Manville courts each considered the extent of its equitable powers
in determining whether to appoint a representative for future
claimants. The UNR and Amatex courts found their equitable
powers narrowly constrained by the plain wording of Chapter 11.17
The Manville court, however, chose to interpret this power
broadly, reasoning that equity power enables the courts to respond
to "extraordinary problems in estate administration."180 The
Manville court's finding is consistent with the long line of cases
that have construed the Code181 as granting broad equity powers to
bankruptcy courts.'82 Courts should not hesitate to use this power
if the provisions of the Code do not preclude the exercise of equi-
table discretion in a particular case.
The definitions in the Code, 8 the legislative history,18 4 and
the great weight of judicial authority'85 support a broad definition
of "claim" for bankruptcy purposes. The UNR and Amatex courts
ignored this authority and focused narrowly on explicit statutory
language and state law constraints on the validity of a claim. These
courts failed to recognize that bankruptcy courts have the power to
consider a claim for bankruptcy purposes regardless of whether it
is a legal claim for state law purposes.8 6 This unncessarily strict
construction of the Bankruptcy Code makes the Code unrespon-
sive to new situations such as future toxic tort claims.
The Manville court at least recognized that Congress intended
for courts to construe the term "claim" broadly,18 7 and the
Manville court's general approach is more consistent with bank-
ruptcy policy. Unfortunately, the Manville court stopped short of
ruling that future claimants are "creditors." Instead, the court left
future claimants in an uncertain position by basing the court's rul-
ing on the "party in interest" rationale. Neither the Manville
court's opinion nor the Bankruptcy Code indicates exactly what
178. See supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
179. 29 Bankr. at 746; 30 Bankr. at 315-16.
180. 36 Bankr. at 758 ("[W]here circumstances warrant, courts readily use their equi-
table powers to protect the substantive rights of persons similarly situated who are not
before the court.").
181. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
182. See cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 44-58.
183. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 31-37.
186. See supra notes 37, 51-58 and accompanying text.
187. 36 Bankr. at 754 n.6 (noting that Congress intended that a court, in a Chapter 11
proceeding, consider all a debtor's obligations).
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"party in interest" status entails. 88 Presumably, if the court did
not consider these claimants to be "creditors," the court could not
bind the claimants to the reorganization plan.189 The court may
have allowed the future claimants to participate through repre-
sentatives in formulating the reorganization plan, but left the fu-
ture claimants free to press individual claims against the debtor if
the plan later becomes unsatisfactory. This result would contra-
vene the goals of bankruptcy. To best serve the goals of reorganiza-
tion in bankruptcy, courts should use their broad equitable powers
to rule that future claims are cognizable in bankruptcy and that
future claimants are creditors.
2. Consistency with Tort Law Policy
Incorporating future claimants' interests in a reorganization
plan is consistent with the basic principles of tort law, namely
compensation and risk allocation. Although Congress, when it re-
drafted the Code, did not foresee tort liability as a potential cause
of bankruptcy, 190 reorganization can accommodate tort law policies
as well as bankruptcy goals. In a typical mass tort action the
debtor corporation, if forced to liquidate, cannot compensate all of
the victims.' 9 ' Reorganization, however, provides a vehicle whereby
the debtor can continue to operate and compensate victims. 92 Fur-
thermore, if the reorganization plan includes the interests of future
claimants, the court can distribute the debtor's compensation pool
more equitably among the class of victims as a whole. 93 Reorgani-
zation that incorporates future claimants' interests, therefore,
serves the first goal of tort law-compensation.
Appointing a representative for future claimants also can serve
another basic goal of tort law-risk allocation. Recent toxic tort
suits9 " have alerted creditors to the possible liability facing their
debtors. Creditors are in a position to exert economic pressure on
188. The court in In re Citizen's Loan & Thrift Co., 7 Bankr. 88 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1980), stated that parties in interest have the "same rights as if they were ... intervenors."
Id. at 90. This statement, however, does not shed any light on the issue of a party in inter-
est's rights and duties under a reorganization plan.
189. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
190. See Note, Relief from Tort Liability, supra note 12, at 1228.
191. See Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions, supra note 82, at 1241.
192. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 741,748 (N.D. Ml. 1983) (Because the court
refused to appoint a representative for future claimants, "claimants may wind up with judg-
ments against corporations left with only one asset a corporate charter.").
193. Note, Who Will Compensate, supra note 6, at 489.
194. See supra notes 1-4.
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debtors to take precautions against accidents and to procure ade-
quate insurance.19 5 Debtors can pass these costs along to consum-
ers. 98 A reorganization plan that provides for future claimants will
enable the debtor to pass on costs more efficiently because the plan
will account for compensation for all claimants.
3. Consistency with Constitutional Principles
The constitutional problems that the appointment of a repre-
sentative for future claimants pose are significant but not insur-
mountable.1 9 7 The Mullane standard of notice requires a court to
balance the interests in bringing all claims to final settlement
against the interest of claimants in notification. This balancing test
is particularly appropriate in planning a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Many courts have noted that the interest in an efficient resolution
of claims is critical in bankruptcy proceedings, "where delay can
often result in diminution of corporate assets with no correspond-
ing benefits to creditors."'1 8 Given the paramount importance to
all interested parties of final resolution in a bankruptcy case, a
court should not unduly burden the debtor and threaten the plan's
success by requiring personal notice to all future claimants. The
Manville court's conclusion that publication notice would suffice is
consistent with the holding in Mullane that publication notice was
adequate for the unknown beneficiaries. The Agent Orange opin-
ion also supports the Manville court's position that notice through
the news media may provide the "best notice practicable under the
circumstances" for some claimants. 199
Furthermore, judicial treatment of the notice requirement in
class actions concerning mass tort claimants does not present an
insurmountable constitutional obstacle. The Agent Orange court
certified a class of toxic tort plaintiffs as a 23(b)(3) class action.00
This certification vitiates the UNR court's argument that bank-
ruptcy courts should not appoint a representative for future claim-
195. See Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions, supra note 82, at 1241.
196. Id.
197. Professor Countryman has suggested that specific circumstances could justify a
relaxation of due process. See Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 5.
198. In re DCA Dev. Corp., 489 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1973); see also cases cited supra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
199. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. 762, 791; see also Manville, 36 Bankr. 743, 756 n.6.
The Agent Orange ruling is more consistent with the language of 23(c)(2), see supra note
84, than the Eisen ruling, which commentators have criticized for being unnecessarily re-
strictive. See Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions, supra note 82, at 1507-08.
200. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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ants because parties cannot bring mass tort claims as class ac-
tions.0 1 In addition, the Agent Orange court based its refusal to
certify a 23(b)(1)(B) class on the absence of any indication that the
claims would bankrupt the defendant.20 The court's reasoning
suggests that a 23(b)(1)(B) class action 203 may be appropriate in
cases in which the mass toxic tort defendant is undergoing reor-
ganization in bankruptcy.
Finally, appointing a representative for future claimants best
serves the general principles of due process by giving these claim-
ants their day in court. Binding future claimants to the reorganiza-
tion plan would further protect their interests because a corpora-
tion could be forced to liquidate if a court allowed future claimants
to assert their claims after the reorganization. Without allowing
representation in the reorganization proceeding, a court may be
denying future claimants any remedy at all.2 04 Binding future
claimants to the reorganization plan, therefore, is more consistent
with the notion that due process should protect claimants' inter-
ests. 205 The Amatex 11 and Manville courts at least allowed repre-
sentation in reorganization, but these courts failed to provide fur-
ther protection by ensuring that the plan would bind the future
claimants.
B. The Dangers of Precedent
The Amatex I and UNR courts explored the dangers of per-
mitting the appointment of a representative for future claimants.
A decision to appoint representatives for future claimants may
force courts to provide for future claims even when a court has no
reason to suspect that such claims will arise. The broad reading of
the term "claim" coupled with the Amatex II and Manville courts'
liberal construction of "party in interest" signifies that the Amatex
I and UNR Courts' warnings may be well taken.0 6 A rule that
201. See supra note 110-11 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
204. See 29 Bankr. at 748; 30 Bankr. at 316 (admitting possibility that claimants will
not receive compensation).
205. See Note, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions, supra note 82, at 1497. The
approach of the UNR court would subvert the purposes of due process. See supra notes
112-15 and accompanying text. The Amatex H and Manville courts at least allowed repre-
sentation in reorganization, but these courts failed to provide for further protection by en-
suring that courts bind the future claimants to the plan. See supra text accompanying notes
188-89.
206. The Manville court found that anyone who had been exposed to asbestos quaili-
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completely prohibits appointing a representative for future claim-
ants, nonetheless, would be unwise. A holding that future claim-
ants are creditors within the meaning of the Code would bind them
to the terms of the plan whether they are represented or not.207
Thus, future claimants will be cut off from litigating their claims in
cases in which no one anticipates future claims. To avoid this dis-
astrous result, courts could appoint representatives for future
claimants as a matter of course. When future claims clearly
threaten the plan, the representative would protect those interests.
When future claims pose little or no threat to the plan, the repre-
sentative would draft a contingency clause requiring that the plan
be reformulated if future claims begin to accumulate.
Legislative action can alleviate the problem of compensating
future toxic tort claimants.208 In fact, several authorities have ad-
fled as a "party in interest." See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. Exposure,
however, may not necessarily lead to an actual injury or disease upon which to base a claim.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1982).
208. Congress could provide a legislative solution to the toxic tort problem patterned
after the program for environmental cleanup costs-the "Superfund." The Comprehensive
Environmental Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9601-57 (1982)), created the
Superfund, which is essentially industry financed, to provide finances for cleaning up haz-
ardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). This fund consists of taxes collected from crude
oil and chemical companies, amounts recovered on behalf of the fund, see id. § 9607, and
penalties assessed under the Act. Id. § 9607(c)(1) (1982). The Superfund, in effect, taxes
hazardous waste producers and forces them to bear the brunt of the expense of hazardous
waste cleanup. CERCLA further provides for a strict liability standard and a corresponding
liability limitation. Id. § 9607(c)(1) (1982). Thus, a plaintiff may not receive as great a re-
covery as a conventional tort suit would allow, but the plaintiff is more likely to obtain some
recovery because the burden of proof is easier to meet.
A legislative solution similar to the Superfund would be appropriate in the toxic tort
context for several reasons. See Grad, Injuries from Exposure to Hazardous Waste: Can
the Victim Recover?, 2 J. PRODs. L. 133 (1983) (noting that the Superfund Study Group
concluded that existing tort law and compensation systems cannot adequately handle the
toxic tort problem); see also Barsky, Abandoning Federal Sovereign Immunity: Public
Compensation for Victims of Latently Defective Therapeutic Drugs, 2 J. PRODS. L. 20, 54
(1983) (advocating a "superfund" system for compensation under the Federal Tort Claims
Act). First, such a program would provide for uniform treatment of tort plaintiffs by impos-
ing a single standard of proof and a single statute of limitations. By simplifying the recovery
process, the program would eliminate the large transaction costs that result from using the
tort system. For example, varying theories currently exist regarding the accrual of a cause of
action in asbestosis cases. Some jurisdictions date the accrual of a cause of action from the
date of exposure to the substance, others date the accrual from the date of discovery of
adverse symptoms, and still others date the accrual from the date that the plaintiff discov-
ers that the injury was probably the result of exposure to the substance. See Special Project,
supra note 5, at 641-51. By imposing a single statute of limitations, a Superfund-type pro-
gram would ensure equal treatment of all toxic tort victims. Similarly, imposing a strict
liability standard would eliminate the disparity between cases brought under negligence or
breach of warranty theories and cases brought under strict liability. For a discussion of the
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vocated congressional action as the only solution to the toxic tort
problem.2 09 A congressional committee has proposed legislation to
deal with the asbestos situation,210 but Congress has yet to act on
the subject. Although a legislative solution to the toxic tort prob-
lem would be desirable, today's victims need compensation now.
Courts can provide for these victims in the bankruptcy context and
should act appropriately when given the opportunity to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
The judicial system clearly needs a legislative solution to the
problem of future claimants in toxic tort litigation. Until such leg-
islation is forthcoming, however, courts must show enough flexibil-
ity to cope with the changing circumstances brought by scientific
advances. Unfortunately, the UNR, Amatex, and Manville courts'
inconsistent treatment of future claims in Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions does a disservice to both bankruptcy and tort law. The status
of future plaintiffs will depend on where defendant debtors file
their Chapter 11 petitions. Moreover, the courts have failed to up-
hold the constitutional mandate of uniformity in bankruptcy
law.2
11
The UNR court's decision not to appoint a representative for
future claimants does not pose the precedential danger that the
Amatex 11 and Manville results present, but this safe approach
may shut off future claimants' recoveries entirely, or leave the
debtor vulnerable to protracted and unlimited liability. The
Amatex II and Manville courts' decisions to appoint a representa-
tive for future claimants at least presented an opportunity to pro-
vide for future claimants' interests. Unfortunately, because the
problems of applying different theories of recovery in asbestos cases, see Special Project,
supra note 5, at 592-607.
Second, the fund would provide a source from which toxic tort victims could recover
damages for their injuries. Admittedly, the fund would probably be insufficient to allow full
recovery for all plaintiffs and may contain a limited liability provision similar to that in
CERCLA. Plaintiffs' recoveries would, nonetheless, be much greater than any recoveries
plaintiffs could expect from a bankrupt corporation. Third, because the fund would provide
for plaintiffs' recoveries, the threat of toxic tort claims would not send otherwise viable
corporations into bankruptcy. Last, the program would ensure that the culpable parties es-
sentially bear the costs of compensating toxic tort victims. For these reasons, a Superfund-
type program offers a workable solution to the toxic tort problem.
209. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 7.
210. See, e.g., Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980: Hearings on S.
2847 Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 169
(1980).
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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Amatex 11 and Manville courts were not willing to hold that future
claimants were creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, appointing a
representative for these claimants left them in an uncertain posi-
tion and may have created more problems than the appointment
solved. The best approach is for bankruptcy courts to exercise
their equitable power to bring future plaintiffs' claims within the
broad definition intended in the Code, thereby giving future plain-
tiffs the rights and the responsibilities of creditors in the reorgani-
zation. This approach best accommodates the competing concerns
of the debtor, prior claimants, future claimants, and the economy
as a whole.
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